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Abstract 
The article begins with a cri tique of a variety of Marxist theories on capitalist 
development and the hegemony of the United States. These theories either see 
capitalism in stagnation and American hegemony in decline since the 1970s or 
understand neoliberalism as the American way to permanent hegemony. The former 
fail to explain accumulation during the era of neoliberalism, the latter can’t explain the 
current crisis of neoliberal capitalism. As an alternative a Luxemburgian approach is 
suggested, which proceeds in two steps. One, core concepts of Rosa Luxemburg’s 
Accumulation of Capital are introduced and the Marxist debate about her work 
reviewed. This is necessary because of the absence of any tradition of Luxemburgian 
political economy. Second, from a Luxemburgian perspective post-war capitalism 
developed in two phases, each of which was possible because class-struggles and 
international conflicts had opened non-capitalist environments for capitalist 
penetration. The first phase gave rise to consumer capitalism and neo-colonialism; the 
second was characterized by accumulation by dispossession that rolled back welfare 
states in the North and developmental states in the South, while also integrating 
formerly state-socialist countries, notably China, into the capitalist world-system. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article commence par une critique de plusieurs théories Marxistes sur le 
développement capitaliste et l’hégémonie des Etats-Unis. Soit ces théories constatent 
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un capitalisme en stagnation et une hégémonie américaine en déclin depuis les années 
soixante-dix, soit elles décrivent le néolibéralisme comme la voie américaine vers 
l’hégémonie permanente. Celles-ci ne peuvent pas expliquer la crise actuelle du 
capitalisme néolibéral, tandis que celles-là échouent à expliquer le processus 
d’accumulation du capital pendant l’ère néolibérale. Comme alternative, l’auteur 
propose une approche inspirée par Luxemburg, en deux temps. Premièrement, il 
introduit les concepts clés de l’Accumulation du capital de Rosa Luxemburg et résume 
les débats Marxistes autour de ses œuvres. Ce temps est nécessaire du fait de l’absence 
d’une tradition d’économie politique à la suite de Luxemburg. Deuxièmement, dans 
une perspective issue de Luxemburg, le capitalisme d’après-guerre s’est développé en 
deux phases, dont chacune était possible parce que les luttes de classes et les conflits 
internationaux ont ouvert des brèches dans des sociétés non-capitalistes pour la 
pénétration du capitalisme. La première phase a permis l’émergence du capitalisme 
consumériste et du néo-colonialisme ; la deuxième se caractérise par l’accumulation 
par dépossession de l’état-providence dans le Nord et des états en développement 
dans le Sud, ainsi que par l’intégration des nations auparavant socialistes, notamment 
la Chine, dans le système-monde capitaliste. 
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Mainstream economists and policy advisors have offered two explanations 
for the Wall Street crash in September 2008 and the concomitant world 
economic crisis. Monetarists saw the loose monetary policies of Alan 
Greenspan, Ben Bernanke and big government as the cause of speculative 
bubbles that eventually burst and crashes (Kindleberger 1978, Akerlof & 
Shiller 2009). The former suggest tight money and austerity, the latter 
reregulation as remedies for future crisis. As emergency measures for 
crisis containment, monetarists prefer bank bailouts while New 
Keynesians advocate for fiscal stimulus. Both groups focus on financial 
markets, policy failures and the short term. Regardless of the fact that 
monetarists wrap their preferred policies in the language of non-
intervention, a crucial implication of these foci is that political intervention 
of one sort or another can help to get the economy back on its long-term 
growth path, which is determined by the growth of labour supply and 
technical progress (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2003). 
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 Marxists have an entirely different view. They see capital 
accumulation as inherently crisis-prone and destined for stagnation. From 
this angle, political intervention may contain a crisis momentarily but will 
not be able to avoid the crisis next time. Only a transition from capitalism 
to socialism can break the crisis cycle (O’Connor 1987). This article 
contributes to the Marxist tradition of crisis theory. More specifically, it 
uses Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital (1913)1 to analyze 
capitalist development and the hegemony of the United States. Central to 
this approach is the idea that capitalism is plagued by a lack of effective 
demand and thus a lack of profitable investment opportunities. Only the 
capitalist expansion into non-capitalist environments, whether these are 
found in the centres or the peripheries of the capitalist world system, can 
save capital accumulation. 
 I shall argue that the United States overcame capitalism’s tendency 
towards stagnation twice since World War II (WWII). In the 1950s and 
1960s, capitalist accumulation penetrated private households and small 
business sectors that were hitherto engaged in simple commodity 
production. This capitalist expansion within the United States consolidated 
the dominance of monopoly capital and went hand in hand with the rise of 
mass consumption (Baran & Sweezy 1966). It was accompanied by foreign 
direct investments and military engagement in the Global South (Magdoff 
1966). Consumer capitalism at home and neo-colonialism abroad triggered 
the post-war boom; they also established the United States firmly as the 
leader of the capitalist centres. Yet, in the 1970s, a series of financial, 
economic and fiscal crises brought tendencies towards stagnation the fore 
again. They were overcome this time by the turn to accumulation by 
dispossession (Harvey 2003), which created new investment opportunities 
by rolling back welfare states in the North and developmental states in the 
South. Due to the crucial role of finance, centred on Wall Street, and the 
military, centred in the Pentagon, the United States could reassert its 
leading role among capitalist powers (Schmidt 2008b). Yet, this reassertion 
needs to be qualified. On the one hand, the United States’ growth from the 
1990s until the present was higher than that of other capitalist centres; on 
the other hand, it was considerably lower than it had been in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
 A number of Marxist theories were developed to understand 
capitalist stagnation and the American decline. Robert Brenner (2002; 
                                                     
1
 Future references to this work are given as AC 
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2006) advanced the argument that accumulation suffers from the restraint 
of overcapacities. Authors affiliated with the Monthly Review (Baran & 
Sweezy 1966; Foster & Magdoff 2009; Sweezy & Magdoff 1977) argue that 
major innovations, namely the automobile and concomitant 
suburbanization, exhausted their growth potential and that subsequent 
innovations did not have the same forward and backward linkages that 
characterized the ones on which consumer capitalism was built. Giovanni 
Arrighi (1994; 2007) makes a similar point by stressing the shift of 
American hegemony from ascendancy, based on competitive advantage 
over other capitalist centres, to decline. The decline, he suggests, is only 
delayed by the United States’ central role in world finance that allows 
extended control and appropriation of capital in other parts of the world. 
 All of the aforementioned theories offer valuable insights into the 
development of American and world capitalism since WWII and 
particularly in case of world-systems theory, even earlier. But they also 
share a major weakness. They identify the crises of the 1970s as the 
turning point from post-war prosperity to stagnation but fail to explain 
why the United States could maintain its leading position in the face of 
lower growth. And they can’t explain why American growth in relative 
terms was higher than it was in competitor countries like Germany and 
Japan. The apparent contradiction between the theoretical diagnosis of 
stagnation and the reality of continuous growth, however small, and 
American hegemony, however hollow, led some Marxists to the conclusion 
that American capitalism is close to being invincible (Panitch & Konings 
2008). However, the Wall Street crash, the world recession of 2008/9, 
continuing fears for a 1930s or 1970s-style double-dip recession, and the 
transformation of private sector crisis into fiscal crises in the United States 
and all other capitalist centres put more than one question mark behind 
claims for enduring American hegemony. While Brenner, Arrighi and the 
Monthly Review-school have difficulties explaining why American 
hegemony could be maintained even in the face of slow growth, Panitch 
and his collaborators are at pains fitting the Crisis this Time (Panitch et al. 
2011) into their theory of continued American hegemony. 
 This is where the Luxemburgian approach suggested in this article 
comes into play. Its focus on capitalism’s need to open non-capitalist 
environments for capitalist penetration allows the distinction of two 
phases of expansion since WWII. In the first phase welfare and 
developmental states facilitated the integration of private households and 
small businesses in the North and subsistence economies in the South into 
the circuits of global capital accumulation. The paradox of this first phase 
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of capitalist expansion was that welfare and developmental states 
facilitated the commodification of non-capitalist environments and limited 
capital accumulation by establishing extended public sectors and 
regulations for the flows of private capital. These latter two aspects were 
the starting point for a phase of accumulation by dispossession, in which 
welfare and developmental states were rolled back and the economic space 
they had controlled was opened up for private capital investments. This 
accumulation by dispossession received a massive boost after the collapse 
of the Soviet Empire and China’s turn to world market integration (Harvey 
2005). Yet the same investments in formerly state socialist countries that 
spurred accumulation from the early 1990s to the present crisis also added 
additional production capacities and are thus a cause of the crisis. 
 Whether one agrees with such arguments or not, the use of a 
Luxemburgian approach needs some explanation. Since the publication of 
the Accumulation of Capital in 1913, critics have charged Luxemburg with 
economic determinism.2 Moreover, the first half of the 20th century, with 
its recurrent wars, revolutions and economic crises, may be seen as 
confirmation of Luxemburg’s theory, but the post-war prosperity and the 
weaker phase of accumulation by dispossession are clearly at odds with 
her prognoses of economic stagnation and the collapse of the capitalist 
system. Yet, Luxemburg devoted approximately one third of the 
Accumulation of Capital to the analysis of economic ideas and policies that 
were discussed at different phases of capitalist development. A recurrent 
theme in these debates was the question of whether accumulation is 
limited by insufficient demand or whether market adjustments will always 
equilibrate supply and demand. The underlying theme that she identifies in 
these debates is the need to search for new areas for capitalist expansion. 
 To show that the Accumulation of Capital represents a genuine 
approach to political economy, as opposed to a deterministic economic 
model3, the next two sections introduce the core concepts of Luxemburg’s 
theory and discuss the critiques of her work in the context of the economic 
and political crisis of their times. The remainder of the article applies 
                                                     
2
 For a critique of such interpretations, see: Geras 1976; Rousseas 1979; Zarembka 2002. 
3
 It should be noted that Luxemburg was well aware of the limitations of purely theoretical 
models. Speaking about propositions derived from such models, she says: ‘…we must further 
inquire whether it is not merely because mathematical equations are easily put on paper’ and 
continues: ‘the time has come to look for the concrete social conditions of accumulation’. (AC 
91) 
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Luxemburg’s political economy to the development of American capitalism 
from the post-war period until today. 
 
Rosa Luxemburg’s Political Economy 
The Accumulation of Capital… 
Luxemburg begins her analysis with a look at the reproduction schemes 
that Marx introduced in Capital, Volume II (1885) to analyze the exchange 
relations between constant capital, variable capital and surplus value on 
the one hand, and on the other, the production of the means of production, 
the reproduction of constant capital and consumer goods, as well as the 
reproduction of variable capital and capitalists’ consumption. From her 
reading of Marx, she concludes that finding ‘an effective demand for the 
surplus values’ (AC 138) is the crucial precondition of capitalist 
accumulation. Going from there, she discusses the possibilities of 
generating such demand from either increased consumption or from 
investment. Any such demand, she argues, only suffices to reproduce the 
already existing wealth in the capitalist economy. Accumulation, however, 
requires additional demand and this can only be found, according to 
Luxemburg, in ‘non-capitalist social environments’ (AC 347). Such non-
capitalist economies, which Luxemburg calls ‘natural economies’ (AC, 
chapter 27), are characterized by subsistence production, barter exchange 
and very limited monetary exchange. At a maximum, ‘commodity 
economies’ (AC, chapter 28) were characterised by ‘simple reproduction’, 
mediated by commodity exchange, but were certainly not driven by the 
imperative to accumulate in a system of ‘expanded reproduction’. 
 A key tool to open up external markets, i.e. capitalist expansion into 
non-capitalist environments, is credit (AC, chapter 30). Credit provides 
economic agents in non-capitalist environment with purchasing power and 
integrates them into the process of capitalist accumulation. The irony of 
this integration is that, whenever it happens, external markets are 
transformed into internal markets that are prone to insufficient demand. 
At some point all previously non-capitalist environments will be absorbed 
into capitalism. The reservoir of additional demand therefore dries up and 
accumulation, therefore, comes to a standstill: ‘Capitalism (…) strives to 
become universal (…) and it must break down – because it is immanently 
incapable of becoming a universal form of production.’ (AC 447) This is a 
logical conclusion, derived from an abstract model of accumulation. 
Regarding the application of such a model to the actual development of 
capitalism, Luxemburg continues: ‘In its living history it (capitalism) is a 
contradiction in itself, and its movement of accumulation provides a 
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solution to the conflict and aggravates it at the same time.’ (AC 447) This 
proposition hardly suggests the automatic collapse of capitalism; it rather 
points towards, to paraphrase Marx, ‘men who make their own history 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’ 
(Marx 1852, 103). In fact, Luxemburg argues that, in order to escape ‘a 
string of political and social disasters and convulsions’, the working class 
has to ‘revolt against the rule of capital’ (AC 447). This implies that labour 
movements have a choice between seeking cooptation by the capitalist 
state or fighting against it and the economic system that it represents. 
Writing in a prison cell during World War I, she labelled this choice as one 
between ‘socialism or barbarism’ (Luxemburg 1916). 
 Another implication of Luxemburg’s theory of accumulation should 
be mentioned, as it will be important for the analysis in the second part of 
this article. Luxemburg rejects the idea, prominent in much of recent 
globalization literature, that capitalism develops within domestic 
economies and enters the world market only at a later stage, which leads to 
the withering of nation-states (Reich 1992). Against such views she 
maintains that ‘international trade is a prime necessity for the historical 
existence of capitalism’ (AC 340) and warns that limits to accumulation 
will lead to increased competition between states (AC, chapters 31-32). 
The crucial distinction, thus, is not between domestic markets and foreign 
markets but between internal markets – ‘the capitalist market’ – and 
external markets – the ‘non-capitalist social environment that absorbs the 
products of capitalism and supplies producer goods and labour power for 
capitalist production’ (AC 347).4 It follows that capitalist expansion does 
not necessarily, certainly not exclusively, consist of capitalist firms 
establishing trading posts and production sites outside the country of their 
origin. It also consists of the replacement of the ‘natural economy’ by the 
‘commodity economy’ and finally the emergence of the imperative to 
accumulate (AC, chapters 27-28) within the borders of all capitalist states. 
For example, the commodification of household production and the 
subjugation of small businesses to the imperatives of capital accumulation 
played a major role in the long boom that began with World War II (Lutz 
1984). 
 As the room for capitalist expansion narrows, competition between 
capitalist firms gets more intense and the state is increasingly seen, 
                                                     
4
 This is an anticipation of Sweezy’s argument in the 1950s debate on the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism (Sweezy et al. 1976). 
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according to Luxemburg, as a means to protect market shares of domestic 
companies against foreign competitors. Thus, the smaller the external 
markets, the more prominent the political and economic role of the state. 
Intensified state competition and militarism are a consequence of this. 
With regards to the latter, Luxemburg says that it ‘is a pre-eminent means 
for the realisation of surplus value; it is in itself a province of accumulation’ 
(AC 434).  This argument, particularly when it is extended from military 
spending to other kinds of public spending (Baran & Sweezy 1966, Kalecki 
1967), points to the role that warfare and welfare states played in the post-
war prosperity and the later phase of accumulation by dispossession. 
Although the latter was ideologically couched in neoliberalism’s anti-state 
propaganda, the state continued to play an important role as ‘a province of 
accumulation’ and an opener for markets in non-capitalist environments 
(Harvey 2003; Harvey 2005). 
 However, before turning to the analysis of American-led capitalism, 
we will have a quick look at the way Luxemburg links debates about 
economic theory, policy and the historical development of capitalism. This 
will help to further the argument that Luxemburg did not develop an 
abstract model of economic collapse but a political economy approach, and 
will also allow us to put the criticism with which her theory met into 
historical perspective. 
 Section II of the Accumulation of Capital discusses three rounds of 
debate about accumulation, crisis tendencies and the need, or potential, for 
political intervention. Each of these debates had, on the one side, defenders 
of indefinite accumulation, which might be hampered by disproportions 
between different economic sectors momentarily, and theoreticians of 
insufficient effective demand on the other. The original liberal argument 
that accumulation feeds itself by creating additional supply and, at the 
same time, demand, was most famously articulated by David Ricardo and 
Jean-Baptiste Say, but was challenged by figures as politically as Thomas 
Malthus and Simonde de Sismondi ‘under the immediate impact of the first 
crises of 1815 and 1818-19 in England’ (AC 147). The second debate took 
place among German economists Johann Karl Rodbertus and Julius 
Hermann von Kirchmann against the background of the ‘risings of the Lyon 
silk weavers and the Chartist movement in England’ (AC 203) and was 
further inspired by ‘the first world crisis in 1857’ (AC 204). Rodbertus saw 
a declining share of wages in total income as a limit to accumulation, which 
he sought to correct by political intervention, an approach earning him the 
title of state socialist, whereas von Kirchmann saw a need for market 
expansion to keep accumulation going. The third debate involved the so-
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called ‘legal Marxists’, most prominently Mikhail Ivanovich Tugan-
Baranovsky, who had witnessed the Great Depression of the 1870s and the 
arrival of mass workers movements across Europe. In assessing the 
prospect of capitalist development in Russia, which the Tsarist government 
had made a priority since the late 1870s, the legal Marxists, says 
Luxemburg, ‘join forces with the bourgeois ‘harmonists’ of the Golden Age 
shortly before the Fall when bourgeois economics was expelled from the 
Garden of Innocence – the circle is closed’ (AC 304). 
 Some notable shifts occurred from one round of debate to the other. 
First, the locus of debate moves from England to Germany and eventually 
to Russia. This trajectory reflects the shift of the centre of accumulation to 
the then-emerging markets in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, the 
economic background of discussion moves from cyclical crisis that inspired 
the critique of classical liberalism to problems of long-term growth raised 
by the Great Depression of the 1870s.5 Third, political solutions that are 
suggested to fix, or overcome, the limits of accumulation shift from 
restoring feudalism – Malthus idea to create a class of unproductive 
consumers who would happily waste capitalist surpluses – to state 
intervention that should – as Rodbertus suggested – create effective 
demand by shifting the income distribution from profits to wages. The 
legal Marxists, believing in unlimited accumulation, thought state 
intervention unnecessary, but Luxemburg, whose analysis of accumulation 
and imperialism represents the counterpart to the legal Marxists, showed 
that militarism and protectionism are the kinds of state intervention that 
become necessary once accumulation reaches the limits of ‘absorbable’ 
non-capitalist environments. The alternative, of course, is a working-class 
revolution against capitalism. 
 
...And its Critics 
Luxemburg’s critics – ranging from the social democrat Otto Bauer (1913) 
to the communists Nikolai Bukharin (1924) and Henryk Grossman (1929) 
and the independent socialist Paul Sweezy (1942) – directed their fire 
almost exclusively against Luxemburg’s formal discussion and critique of 
Marx’s reproduction schemes. That she moved from an abstract model to a 
                                                     
5
 It should be noted that Luxemburg explicitly claims to develop a theory of long-term 
accumulation instead of a theory of business cycles: ‘In order to demonstrate the pure 
implications of capitalist reproduction we must rather consider it quite apart from the 
periodical cycles and crises.’ (AC 7) 
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discussion of theories of accumulation at certain historical junctures and 
only then developed her theoretically and historically based theory either 
escaped their attention or was consciously ignored. However, putting their 
critique into historical perspective and considering their own political 
projects helps to understand why they rejected Luxemburg’s theory so 
strongly. 
 Against Luxemburg’s proposition that accumulation would be 
impossible without the expansion into non-capitalist environments, Bauer 
argued that accumulation may, because of the uncoordinated nature of 
private investment decisions, see temporary disproportions between 
economic sectors but wouldn’t be curtailed by a general lack of effective 
demand. Bauer’s close ally Hilferding developed the implications of this 
argument, which represents some kind of ‘supply-side-Marxism’, more 
thoroughly. According to Hilferding, the emergence of monopoly capitalism 
made the dangers of disproportionality crises much more severe than they 
were under competitive capitalism because cartels and corporations don’t 
have to cut back production capacities and prices during a cyclical 
downturn the way that small companies do. Therefore, overcapacities in 
the cartelized sector prevail longer than they would under conditions of 
free market competition (Hilferding 1910). However, the concentration 
and centralization of large parts of the economy in just a few hands, 
moving towards a ‘general cartel’, also creates, according to Hilferding, the 
conditions for an ‘organized capitalism’, in which the state, representing 
the interests of capitalists and workers, would allocate economic resources 
in such a way that their full use could be guaranteed and, by implication, 
disproportions be avoided (Smaldone 1988). Hilferding advocated for his 
idea of ‘organized capitalism’, today’s social scientists might call it 
corporatism, during the early years of World War I and again in the mid-
1920s, between the end of the revolutionary wave following the war and 
the beginning of the Great Depression. 
 Bukharin’s analysis of capitalism and his critique of Luxemburg are 
strikingly similar to Bauer’s. Their common point of reference is 
Hilferding’s ‘Finance Capital’ whose economic analysis Bukharin widely 
accepts. He also agrees with Hilferding’s political conclusion that monopoly 
capitalism could lead to some kind of ‘organized capitalism’, which 
Bukharin rebranded ‘state capitalism’ (Bukharin 1915). The only 
disagreement he has with Hilferding and Bauer is that the latter two 
accepted Kautsky’s theory of ‘ultra-imperialism’ (1914), which argues that 
conflict between states can be moderated politically in the same manner as 
class antagonisms within countries. After the outbreak of World War I, one 
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didn’t need to be a communist like Bukharin to reject the idea of ‘ultra-
imperialism’ on purely empirical grounds. However, Bukharin had 
something to explain after the economic crises and revolutionary 
upheavals that had ended the war gave way to a period of ‘relative 
stabilization of capitalism’ around 1923. At this time, Bukharin (1924) 
picked up his Hilferding-style analysis of accumulation and turned it 
against Luxemburg. His aim was to reorient communists who were waiting 
for a return of crisis and open class struggle in the capitalist world towards 
support for the young Soviet Union, which he presented as the only beacon 
of hope during a time of capitalist stabilization. Luxemburg became a key 
target in this regard because her ideas were still influential among 
communists after she had been murdered in 1919. 
 Only two years after proclaiming the stabilization of capitalism, 
Bukharin, for reasons having more to do with factional battles among the 
Bolsheviks than with clear economic foresight (Kozlov & Weitz 1989), 
announced a period of imminent crisis. The hostility of Soviet communism 
towards Luxemburg’s ideas remained, though. Henryk Grossmann, 
working at Frankfurt’s famous Institute for Social Research at the time but 
also being a member of the communist party, picked up Bauer’s critique of 
Rosa Luxemburg, which he fully endorsed, and developed a supply-side 
argument for capitalist breakdown out of this critique (Grossmann 1929). 
It was not the lack of non-socialist environments and effective demand, as 
in Luxemburg’s analysis, but the lack of investable surplus that was the 
reason for collapse in Grossmann’s theory. The publication of his book in 
1929 couldn’t have been more timely, even though his arguments were 
refuted by a capitalist system awash with money seeking profitable 
investments but short of effective demand (Sweezy 1942).6 
 After reviewing Marxist theories of crisis, Sweezy picked up 
Luxemburg’s ‘demand-side Marxism’ in his ‘Theory of Capitalist 
Development’. Predictably, Sweezy doesn’t agree with the way Luxemburg 
makes her case for insufficient demand and stagnation, in fact he strongly 
rejects it, but he arrives at quite similar conclusions by saying that the 
trend to ‘chronic depression’ (Sweezy 1942) might be delayed by 
exceptional circumstances but is unavoidable over the long haul. This 
ambiguity between recognizing the possibility of further accumulation and 
tendencies towards stagnation reflects the uncertainties of the times 
during which he wrote his book. A full-scale war effort had pulled the 
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 For a more positive interpretation of Grossmann’s work see Kuhn 2007. 
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American economy out of its decade-long depression in the early 1940s, a 
confirmation of Luxemburg’s views on the economic role of militarism, but 
contemporaries across the political spectrum were still suspicious that the 
end of the war and the subsequent reduction in arms production would 
signal a return of a depression. 
 As Luxemburg used 19th century controversies on accumulation to 
develop her own analysis of turn of the century imperialism7, we might use 
the debate that followed the publication of her Accumulation of Capital to 
gain some ideas for our analysis of 20th century capitalism. One might even 
get the impression that history repeats itself. For example, current ideas 
about a New or Green New Deal make open references to Roosevelt’s New 
Deal in the 1930s and can theoretically draw on the Bauer-Hilferding 
tradition. Links can also be drawn from Hilferding’s analysis of ‘Finance 
Capital’ to ideas about finance-led growth (Boyer 2000), which were fairly 
popular before the financial crises of 2001 and 2008. Moreover, the turn 
from the New Economy to the War on Terror after the 2001 crisis looks 
like the rise of militarism at the end of the 19th century. More generally, 
world-systems theorists like Arrighi and Wallerstein draw parallels 
between the decline of the British Empire about a century ago and the 
current decline of American hegemony. Their theory is based on the idea of 
‘systemic cycles’ (Arrighi 1994) that describes hegemonic powers whose 
organization of production and trade is more productive than others: once 
they lose their competitive edge, the hegemonic powers maintain their 
dominant position by reaping financial profits off of other countries, but 
then eventually decline. When considering theories of hegemonic cycles 
the question of ‘who is next?’ arises. Arrighi recently suggested that China 
would succeed the United States as a world leader (Arrighi 2007).  Yet, it 
remained unclear in his analysis whether this will lead to conflict between 
decaying capitalism, still led by the United States, and a somehow non-
capitalist China or whether China is bound to become a capitalist hegemon. 
Other left analysts, more critical about China, see it either as a capitalist 
competitor (Li 2008) to Western capitalism or the latest incumbent to the 
Western club of imperialists (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg 2005). The same 
old questions arise all over again: Will the ‘ultra-imperialist’ cooperation 
among great powers turn into imperialist conflict? Is the world economy in 
for a period of stagnation or will a new capitalist hegemon rise and spur 
                                                     
7
 It should be noted that the German original appeared of her book appeared with the subtitle 
‘A Contribution to the Analysis of Imperialism’ 
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the rest of the world economy? Or will we see a transition towards 
socialism? 
 The following analysis uses Luxemburg’s theory of accumulation to 
show that the United States-led wave of accumulation in the 20th century 
put questions on the agenda of the early 21st century that are strikingly 
similar to those at the dawn of American hegemony. In fact, one wonders 
whether world capitalism has gone full circle since the Accumulation of 
Capital was published and whether we are headed for a similar period of 
conflict and crises that Luxemburg so aptly predicted in her work. 
However, this does not suggest, like world-systems theory implies, that 
economies and societies develop in endless circles. The ‘demand-side 
Marxism’ that Luxemburg developed suggests that capitalist development 
is plagued by a tendency towards stagnation. The tensions between its 
built-in growth imperative and limits to accumulation lead to political 
conflicts, which, under particular circumstances, may open new fields for 
capitalist expansion. The United States actually became a hegemonic power 
because it opened such fields in the past but that doesn’t mean that 
capitalism will see yet another wave of accumulation. The analysis of this 
development is woven around three threads: First, the need to find non-
capitalist environments for further accumulation; second, the need to 
subordinate working classes to the imperatives of accumulation and 
capitalist rule, and third, the need for a hegemonic power to avoid 
imperialist conflict.8 
 
American Hegemony and Capitalist Development 
A period of rather high growth was drawing to a close when the 
Accumulation of Capital was published in 1913. A year later, a period of 
wars, revolutions, counterrevolutions and economic crises began that seem 
to confirm the gloomy outlook with which Luxemburg had concluded the 
book. Colonial powers, after dividing the worlds’ peripheries amongst 
themselves, turned to war against each other. It was not long after that 
workers in many countries rebelled against their misuse as cannon fodder 
in a war that wasn’t theirs. The political and economic stabilization that 
followed WWI and its revolutionary aftermath in the 1920s didn’t last long. 
                                                     
8
 World-systems theory is particularly strong on the last point, but doesn’t say much on the 
first. However, a recent book by Beverly Silver (2003) systematically incorporates the role of 
working classes into the analysis of capitalist development. Workers and their struggles were 
more of a sideshow in earlier contributions by world systems theorists (Arrighi et al. 1989). 
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The 1930s were a decade of economic depression, labour unrest and civil 
war, all of which contributed to the outbreak of WWII. 
 Yet, the Western welfare states, Eastern state socialism, and 
Southern developmental states9 that shaped the world after WWII 
apparently rebutted Luxemburg’s theories about the limits of capital 
accumulation and ever intensifying class struggle. In turn, her social 
democratic and communist critics seemed to win the day. By and large, 
welfare states, whatever their differences across countries, fit Hilferding’s 
idea of organized capitalism, where representatives from labour, capital 
and the state would cooperate in such a way that economic imbalances 
could be avoided. Political class compromise and Keynesian demand 
management spurred unprecedented economic growth, which allowed the 
transformation of impoverished workers into affluent consumers. 
Imperialist rivalries were superseded by international cooperation within 
the United Nations and Bretton Woods systems and a number of other 
organisations. Colonies gained political independence and overcame their 
role as outlets for surplus production from the capitalist centres by 
developing their own industries and domestic markets. Kautsky might 
have called this combination of international cooperation and economic 
development of the South ‘ultraimperialism’ and might have seen it as a 
way to overcome inequalities across countries in much the same way as 
Hilferding saw organized capitalism as a way to overcome inequalities 
within countries. Moreover, the consolidation and expansion of Soviet 
communism into Eastern Europe and the Chinese revolution seemingly 
proved Bukharin’s argument that socialism would not emerge from 
capitalist decline and workers revolution but from further development of 
the Soviet Union. Of course, the expansion of state socialism diminished the 
capitalist world market but this did not seem to impede capitalist 
accumulation at all. Thus, the idea that expansion into non-capitalist 
environments is a necessary condition for growth looked rather futile. Yet, 
such expansion occurred and fuelled the long boom in the post-war period. 





                                                     
9
 For an overview of postwar developments in these ‘three worlds’, see Birnbaum (2001) and 
Haggard & Kaufman (2008). 
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Post-War Prosperity: Consumer Capitalism and Neo-Colonialism 
Workers struggles in the capitalist centres and anti-colonial struggles in 
the South – both inspired and supported by the Soviet Union to a greater or 
lesser extent – created an appetite among capitalist classes to co-opt and 
integrate these respective movements. Welfare and developmental states 
became the tools towards this political end but also the means for market 
expansion. This argument may seem counterintuitive. After all, 
nationalizations in both kinds of states diminished the areas for capitalist 
operations and rising shares of taxation and public spending along with 
increased protective measures for labour protective limited capitalists’ 
control over increasing parts of the economy. Though increased state 
intervention during the post-war era certainly had these limiting effects on 
capitalist accumulation, it also had the effect of opening up new markets to 
capitalist expansion (Schmidt 1997). In the capitalist centres, this is 
particularly true for economic activity in working class households and 
small businesses, like farming, craft production, and retail. All of these 
areas had certainly, in Luxemburg’s terms, passed from the stage of 
‘natural economies’ to ‘commodity economies’. Increased wages bought 
consumer goods and small businesses produced, or offered services, for 
market sale. However, there was still ample room for capitalist expansion 
into non-capitalist environments. A significant share of household 
production – food preservation and processing, cleaning and care work, 
mostly done by women – was still outside the cash-nexus. Small 
businesses, in turn, remained largely in the realm of ‘simple reproduction’, 
which means that all revenue exceeding their costs went into consumption 
and possibly some retirement savings but not into business expansion. 
Many of these small businesses were, particularly after the Great 
Depression, burdened with debt that made them easy prey for capitalist 
corporations seeking market outlets. State intervention in the post-war 
era, partly going back to interventions during the war, contributed to the 
penetration of the household and small business sectors by the 
imperatives of accumulation or ‘expanded reproduction’, respectively 
(Gordon & Rosenthal 2003).  
 Moderated by the state, compacts between labour and capital were 
negotiated in key industries. This ‘organized capitalism’ turned workers, to 
a greater or lesser extents, into consumers, indeed. Crucially, though, 
purchases of refrigerators, washers and other household appliances were a 
form of capitalist expansion into the non-capitalist environment of 
household production. The same is true for the expansion of culture 
industries into the realms of community-based cultures. These expansions 
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were further advanced by state built infrastructures that allowed cheap 
delivery of mass produced goods. As a result, small businesses serving only 
local markets were increasingly replaced by a combination of large-scale 
producers and retail chains. Of course, infrastructure investments also 
spurred accumulation directly, particularly in construction industries. 
 Capitalist expansion was further fuelled by the industrialization of 
peripheral countries, however incomplete this was. Though developmental 
states were aiming at the emergence of domestic industries and markets, 
they also had to import capital, namely investment goods and technologies, 
from the capitalist centres. State-backed development thus helped to 
expand capitalist relations of production in previously non-capitalist 
environments in the periphery. 
 The idea of substituting domestic class struggle for welfare states 
and imperialist rivalry and colonial exploitation for international 
cooperation and development were not new, as the theories of ‘organized 
capitalism’ and ‘ultraimperialism’ show. In the past, they had been resisted 
because ruling classes in the capitalist centres considered concessions to 
labour and anti-colonial movements as first steps in undermining their 
political power and economic wealth. Towards the end of WWII, the 
neoliberal mastermind Friedrich Hayek (1944) was still warning of ‘the 
road to serfdom’, but the thinking of the ruling classes was changing at that 
time. There was no doubt that the United States was establishing itself as 
the unchallenged leader of the capitalist centres so that imperialist 
rivalries became obsolete. Containment of Soviet and Chinese communism 
became the main goal of this collective imperialism, led by the United 
States (Schmidt 2008a). Anti-communism, though, was not only directed 
against communist regimes in Moscow and Beijing but also against radical 
currents in Western labour movements and Southern developmental 
states. The Cold War, then, created the conditions under which welfare and 
developmental states became politically acceptable for ruling classes in the 
capitalist centres. As already shown, the acceptance of state moderation 
also opened new fields of non-capitalist environments for capitalist 
expansion. Of course, the Cold War also came with an arms economy 
(Baran & Sweezy 1966) that confirmed Luxemburg’s views on the role of 
militarism in the process of capitalist accumulation.  
 
The End of Prosperity 
Mass consumption in the West, industrialization in the South and generally 
increased state expenditures, including arms production and 
infrastructure investments, were the sources of economic growth during 
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the post-WWII-boom. Its political basis was a Cold War bloc of United 
States-led Western bourgeoisies, trade unions and development regimes in 
the South. By the 1970s, though, the post-war boom went bust. Markets for 
mass consumer goods showed signs of saturation after the top layers of 
Western working classes, who were integrated into capital-labour-
compacts, had adopted middle-class lifestyles. The arms economy, which 
had spurred accumulation in the United States during the 1950s and 60s so 
much, had unintended effects because Germany and Japan, where arms 
production was insignificant compared to the United States, had used the 
long boom to build up export industries that became major competitors of 
American corporations in the 1970s. The combined outcome of market 
saturation and the emergence of new export industries were 
overcapacities in the industrial sectors that had been growth engines 
during the boom (Brenner 2002). In this respect, things could only get 
worse because some of the developmental regimes, particularly in South 
Asia, were turning from the development of their domestic markets, the 
expansion into non-capitalist environments on their own territory, to the 
markets of rich countries in the West. 
 Inevitably, non-capitalist environments were by no means 
exhausted by the 1970s. Poor workers, often immigrant and female, in the 
capitalist centres were still performing unpaid work in the private 
household sector on top of their low-wage work. In the South, the 
penetration of vast hinterlands around a few isolated centres of 
industrialization had hardly begun. Thus, from a purely economic point of 
view, further capitalist expansion would have been possible (Heim 1996). 
However, ruling classes were reconsidering their views on welfare and 
developmental states for political reasons (Jenkins & Eckert 2000). A wave 
of labour militancy and anti-colonial struggles had shaken the capitalist 
world since the 1960s. In the capitalist centres, workers struggled for 
higher wages and welfare state expansion, and against Taylorist factory 
regimes (Horn 2007). Higher wages and further expansion of the welfare 
state could have created higher demand for consumer goods. Yet, equal 
wages for both sexes and workers of all colours were incompatible with 
the preservation of segmented labour markets that capitalists considered 
as crucial for their rule over the working class (Edwards 1979). Over the 
course of the 1970s, capitalists came to the conclusion that it was better to 
reinforce control over workers even at the price of losing some of these 
workers as affluent consumers. 
 At the same time, different cross-class coalitions in the South fought 
against imperialist domination and for a new world economic order 
SCHMIDT: Rosa Luxemburg’s Accumulation of Capital  
 
109 
(Murphy 1983). Things came to a head with the oil-price hikes in 1973 and 
1979, and workers demands for nominal wage increases that would 
compensate them for the loss of purchasing power that came with higher 
oil prices. The confluence of struggles over wages and resource prices 
convinced the ruling classes in the West that it was time to fight back 
against welfare and developmental states that were increasingly seen as a 
springboard for accelerating claims by workers and poor countries’ 
peoples. Moreover, oil price hikes put the issue of ecological limits of 
capital accumulation onto ruling classes’ radar screens. As a result of the 
economic and ecological crises of the 1970s, they turned to neoliberalism 
(Glyn 2006). 
 Fiscal austerity and tight money were the means to undermine the 
bargaining power of workers and developmental regimes. This strategy, 
combined with military interventions against left-leaning governments in 
the South, allowed capitalist centres to reclaim monopoly access to the 
world’s resources. Politically, the neoliberal assault on developmental and 
welfare states helped to restore the power of capital over workers and of 
capitalist centres over peripheries (Glyn 2006). Moreover, the weight of 
international finance and the military, both dominated by the United 
States, in the neoliberal policy package helped to regain American 
hegemony, which had not only been challenged by workers and other 
popular movements from below but also by export-oriented accumulation 
in Germany and Japan. After the neoliberal turn, the latter were still a 
competitive threat to American manufacturers, not unwelcome in 
maintaining wage pressures on American workers, but they were unable to 
compete with ‘Pentagon Wall Street Capitalism’ (Schmidt 2008b). 
 
Accumulation by Dispossession 
The restoration of American hegemony and capitalist power more 
generally had an economic Achilles’ heel, though. The forms of capitalist 
expansion that made the long post-war boom possible, namely the rise of 
consumer capitalism in the West and domestically oriented 
industrialization in the South, were either challenged or directly attacked 
by neoliberal policies. New areas and forms for capitalist expansion had to 
be found, if stagnation, a recurrent theme in economic debates during the 
1970s, was to be avoided. 
 Theoretically, the adherents of neoliberal policies denied such 
problems with reference to Say’s Law according to which supply creates its 
own demand if state intervention doesn’t tie up the invisible hand of the 
market. In the early 1980s, this argument, which had been criticized by 
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Marx and Luxemburg, but also by the bourgeois economist Keynes, was 
updated with a renewed emphasis on Schumpeter’s idea of innovation as a 
driver of economic growth.10 Many Keynesian economists consider the 
turn from demand management to supply-side policies as the reason for 
the growth slowdown following the long boom of the 1950s and 60s 
(Skidelsky 2009). It should be noted, though, that the Keynesian business 
cycle models that guided economic policies during the long boom, denied 
the need for expansion into non-capitalist environments as much as it was 
denied by the supply-side theories that became popular under 
neoliberalism. A Luxemburgian perspective draws a different picture: On 
the one hand it confirms the Keynesian assertion that neoliberal policies 
constrained capital accumulation. On the other hand, it shows that these 
policies did create new forms of capitalist expansion to avoid stagnation. 
Neoliberal rhetoric about market notwithstanding, it was the state that 
played a crucial role in initiating and furthering forms of expansion that 
David Harvey described as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (2003, 145-
152), though it might have been more precise to speak about the enforced 
transfer of public property, or that of working class households and small 
businesses, into corporate property. 
 The most obvious form of such transfers is the privatization of 
publicly owned industries, such as telecommunications and railways, or 
public services, such as health care. In terms of scale, these privatizations 
in the West paled in comparison to the transformation of state socialism 
into capitalism in the East. With the Soviet Empire collapsing and China 
turning to capitalism with retention of its political system, vast new 
territories were opened up for capital accumulation11.  
 Aside from privatizations, massive expansions of credit and stock 
markets, beginning in the 1980s and picking up steam in the 1990s, played 
a key role in furthering capital accumulation under neoliberalism. This was 
a way to boost consumer demand in a time of wage restraint and allowed 
corporate finance to gain control over pension plans. The United States 
more than any other capitalist centre positioned itself as the world’s 
financial centre and consumer of last resort at the same time. This latter 
role allowed some of the former developmental states to become exporters 
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 This new wave of Schumpeterian thinking was later labeled ‘endogenous growth theory’. 
For a comprehensive survey see Aghion & Howitt 1998. 
11
 Current debates about future prospects of capital accumulation bear strong resemblance to 
the controversies about capitalist development in Russia, to which Luxemburg contributed in 
The Accumulation of Capital (AC, chapters 18-24). 
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of mass-produced consumer goods. Export-oriented accumulation in the 
South was accompanied by large-scale destruction of subsistence 
production and small businesses that previously had contributed to the 
simple reproduction within local economies12.  
 The overall outcome of neoliberal forms of accumulation were 
contradictory, though: On the one hand, the assault on welfare and 
developmental states led to a redistribution from wages to profits and 
from poor to rich countries, thus swelling the capital funds seeking 
profitable investment opportunities. On the other hand, there was never 
enough room for capitalist expansion to absorb all these funds. Parts of 
them ended up in financial markets where they fuelled claims for future 
profit even further without contributing to the accumulation of productive 
capital. The ever-widening gap between productive accumulation and 
financial accumulation was filled by asset-inflation, which led to recurrent 
financial and economic crises in every corner of the world and eventually 
caused the Wall Street crash and Great Recession of 2008. Determined 
intervention by governments and central banks halted the threat of 
imminent collapse of the worldwide circulation of capital and contained 
the depths of the crisis. However, these interventions did not solve the 
underlying problem of too much capital chasing to few profitable 
investment opportunities. By pouring liquidity and public money into the 
global financial system, over-accumulated capital was saved from 
depreciation and is therefore still looking for investment opportunities 
that aren’t on the horizon. Over the past two decades a number of 
emerging economies of the South, notably China, provided vast outlets for 
capital investments. Utilization of the production capacities that were 
created during this process would require the transformation of Southern 
workers, at least a significant share of them, into affluent consumers. 
Ironically enough, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), usually an 
advocate of low wages and welfare state retrenchment, tells Chinese leader 
that they should turn to the kind of welfare capitalism that Western 
countries abandoned in the 1970s (IMF 2010). Yet, chances are that the 
new Chinese capitalist class in alliance with its Western business friends 
will prefer the continued exploitation of cheap Chinese labour rather than 
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 Analyses of this ‘new wave’ of capitalist expansion into non-capitalist environments, 
including the role of international finance, often read like the late 19
th
 century wave of 
expansion that Luxemburg (AC, chapters 20-37) described. 
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allow trade unions and welfare state bureaucrats to interfere with their 
businesses (Ho-fung 2009; Schmidt 2010).  
 Moreover, since neoliberal accumulation was centred in the United 
States, the current economic crisis also affects American hegemony. Not in 
the sense that any other country or group of countries seemes capable of 
replacing the United States in that position but in the sense that the United 
States is no longer capable of inventing new frontiers that would allow 
capital accumulation on a world scale to recover from the Great Recession. 
Chances are that Luxemburg’s closing remarks in the Accumulation of 
Capital also qualify as an apt assessment of the current condition of 
capitalism: 
 
The more ruthlessly capital sets about the destruction of non-capitalist strata, 
at home and in the outside world, the more it lowers the standard of living for 
the workers as a whole, the greater also is the change in the day-to-day 
history of capital. It becomes a string of political and social disasters and 
convulsions, and under these conditions, punctuated by periodical economic 
catastrophes or crises, accumulation can go on no longer. But even before 
this natural economic impasse of capital’s own creating is properly reached it 
becomes a necessity for the international working class to revolt against the 
rule of capital.’ (AC, 447) ‘ 
 
Conclusion 
The preceding depiction of capitalist accumulation under American 
hegemony is obviously more a sketch than a proper analysis. It still lacks 
conceptual underpinnings and empirical support. Instead of that it offers a 
string of hypotheses. Such a loose approach is justified because there is no 
tradition of Luxemburgian political economy on which an analysis of 
United States-led accumulation could be built. Strong criticism of her work 
during the first half of the 20th century was followed by near oblivion in the 
second half. Considering this state of things, it is more appropriate to lay 
out the principles of Luxemburg’s own approach to political economy, as in 
the first part of this article and then present some hypotheses showing 
how her approach could be used for the analysis of capitalist development 
now. Particularly important in this respect is the finding that a careful 
reading of Luxemburg’s theory of accumulation contradicts widely shared 
interpretations of her theory to be purely economic and deterministic. 
Conversely, this article suggests, Luxemburg’s theory carefully considers 
the role of economic ideas as a means to articulate social interests. It also 
reflects the impact of class struggle, the result of antagonistic social 
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interests, on economic developments. Given recurrent outbursts of class 
struggle, economic crises and ideological dispute, chiefly between 
Keynesianism and (neo-)liberalism, over the last century, Luxemburg’s 
political economy looks like a promising approach to enrich our 
understanding of recent history and current developments. The sketch on 
capitalist development under American hegemony that was offered in this 
article is an invitation to use this approach for more comprehensive 
analyses in the future. 
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